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What you are is what you like –  
similarity biases in venture capitalists’  
evaluations of start-up teams 
 
Abstract 
This paper extends recent research studying biases in venture capitalist’s decision-making. We 
contribute to this literature by analyzing biases arising due to similarity between a venture capitalist 
and members of a venture team. We summarize the psychological foundations of such similarity 
effects and derive a set of hypotheses regarding the impact of similarity on the assessement of team 
quality. Using data from a conjoint experiment with 51 respondents, we find that venture capitalists 
tend to favor teams that are similar to themselves w.r.t. the type of training and professional 
experience. Our results have important implications for academics and practitioners alike. 
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1 Executive Summary 
Studies on the investment processes of VCs and in particular on the criteria VCs employ to make 
their investment decisions have a relatively long tradition in entrepreneurship research, with the first 
studies ranging back to the 1970s (Zopounidis, 1994). These studies have produced a number of 
valuable insights into the VC decision process. The results are often interpreted as direct evidence on 
the long-term success factors of new firms, because professional investors who earn their money by 
investing in new firms are considered to possess much experience in distinguishing winners from 
losers (Riquelme and Rickards, 1992).  
Though research gives key insights into the criteria used in the evaluation process, more recent 
studies reveal that previous results might be misleading due to (1) methodological shortcomings, as 
most research in this area relies on post hoc methodologies which typically suffer from problems of 
recalling past information (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1999; Zacharakis and Meyer, 1998), and (2) 
biases in the decision process of VCs (Shepherd et al., 2003; Zacharakis and Meyer, 2000).  
In this paper, we analyze a new form of bias, namely, systematic distortions of VC evaluations that 
derive from the similarity between rater (VC) and ratee (start-up team). In a nutshell, our research 
hypothesis states: “The higher the similarity between the profile of a venture capitalist and the profile 
of a start-up team, the more favorable the evaluation by the venture capitalist will be.” Hence, this 
study in the field of entrepreneurship is the first to apply the “similarity-hypothesis” (Byrne, 1971) that 
has gained much interest in psychology, human resources management, and marketing to investment 
decisions by VCs. 
In order to avoid some of the problems associated with post hoc methodologies, we use a conjoint 
data design which allows us to vary the characteristics of teams experimentally. We obtain preference 
rankings from 51 VCs regarding venture teams with particular characteristics. These rankings are 
analyzed using an ordered probit estimation model that includes team characteristics and similarity 
measures.  
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Our results give clear evidence that two of the five dimensions of similarity under consideration are 
statistically relevant. First, VCs with prior experience of working in either start-ups or large firms will 
tend to prefer teams with individuals coming from these backgrounds. And second, VCs who 
themselves have an engineering and managerial education tend to rate teams in which both 
competencies are present much higher than VCs who do not have this background. Other similarity 
dimensions (similarity in age, experience in leading teams and level of academic education) do not 
contribute to an explanation of the conjoint rankings in our data. However, our findings clearly show 
that similarity biases do play a significant role in venture capitalists’ assessments of start-up teams. 
Hence, we are able to explain some of the variation occurring in venture capitalists’ assessments on 
the basis of psychological theory.  
Our results have important implications for future research and for practitioners:  
• As to academic research, earlier studies of the VC evaluation process (with some notable 
exceptions) made the implicit assumption that VCs’ ratings (of business plans, teams, etc.) 
concentrate around a certain “correct” evaluation, deviating from it by random errors only. Our 
results reject this assumption – deviations are not random, but contain systematic errors. Future 
research into the VC evaluation process should take this subjectivity into account. Specifically, 
this finding is relevant for research into success factors of start-ups, as they challenge the 
canonical practice of treating VCs’ assessments as “objective” and unbiased success factors.  
• Venture capital firms should be somewhat worried about the similarity biases we identified. It 
means that the persons evaluating business plans have systematically different preferences. As in 
our survey, in 55 percent of all cases only one person decides to reject or endorse the submitted 
business plans (thus to invite the team), this means that the screening process contains an 
unintentional component of randomness. This stands in sharp contrast to the extensive efforts 
undertaken to objectively assess the start-up potential in later steps of the evaluation process. 
• For new venture teams, our results imply that it is not only the choice of the right VC firm that 
matters, but also the person who gets to read the business plan within the firm. Start-up teams 
should not be easily discouraged by a rejection, as it may be due to the fact that the team’s and the 
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rater’s profiles were strongly different, and may not say too much about the likelihood of being 
funded elsewhere. 
2 Introduction 
In the past three decades venture capital (VC) has evolved into a distinct industry within the 
financial services sectors of Western economies. As a major source of finance for new firms, 
particularly in high-technology industries, VC firms not only assume the role of risk financiers within 
the financial sector, but also serve as catalysts for innovation and renewal in the broader economy 
(Shepherd et al., 2000).  
The success of VC firms is largely determined by their ability to predict new firm performance 
during a multi-stage evaluation process of investment proposals. Their special expertise in weeding 
out bad investment proposals is documented by research findings showing that VC-backed businesses 
achieve higher survival rates than non-VC-backed firms (Sandberg, 1986; Timmons, 1994). Hence, it 
is not surprising that the evaluation process of VCs has received much attention by the research 
community in entrepreneurship and finance (Wells, 1974; Poindexter, 1976; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; 
MacMillan et al., 1985; Sandberg et al., 1988; Muzyka et al., 1996; Zacharakis and Meyer, 1998), as it 
is supposed to give valuable insights on the criteria that distinguish successful from unsuccessful new 
firms.  
However, more recent studies reveal that previous results might be misleading due to biases in the 
decision process of VCs (Shepherd et al., 2003; Zacharakis and Shepherd, 2001). This challenges the 
implicit assumption of earlier studies that evaluations by VCs can be treated as objective assessments 
of new venture quality disturbed only by a random error. Hence, research on the nature of these biases 
is elementary for our understanding of the relationship between VCs and new ventures, and of success 
factors of new firms. To date, research has been limited to biases due to the information processing or 
characteristics of the VCs (Shepherd et al., 2003; Zacharakis and Shepherd, 2001). This study is the 
first to systematically analyze similarity biases, emerging from an interaction between start-up team 
and VC characteristics. 
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We propose that some share of the heterogeneity of evaluations across venture capitalists is due to 
the similarity within the dyad. According to this hypothesis, venture capitalists will prefer (ceteris 
paribus) start-ups whose venture team members1 share major characteristics with them. Thus, the 
discrepancies between the evaluation results of venture capitalists are conjectured not to be random, 
but to vary systematically with the personal profile of the rater and the characteristics of the team. 
Such biases can be explained on the basis of psychological theories. We focus in our analysis on the 
evaluation of venture team characteristics, and we do so for three reasons. First, research has shown 
that criteria related to the management team are consistently considered predominant in the evaluation 
process (Zopounidis, 1994). Second, the notion of similarity or dissimilarity between VC and the new 
venture is more likely to make sense with respect to team characteristics than, e.g., with respect to the 
business model of the new venture. Third, similarity with respect to team characteristics is relatively 
easy to observe for a VC (and for the researcher). 
A sample of 51 VCs is used to test our hypotheses. In order to avoid some of the problems 
associated with post hoc methodologies, we use a conjoint data design which allows us to vary the 
characteristics of teams experimentally.2 Each VC in our sample was asked to rank 20 hypothetical 
teams which were described in terms of seven characteristics, in a way that models simplified team 
descriptions in business plans. The resulting rankings are analyzed using ordered probability models.  
We find clear evidence supporting our hypothesis: two of the five dimensions of similarity under 
consideration are statistically significant. First, VCs with prior experience of working in start-ups tend 
to prefer teams with individuals who had gathered professional experience in new ventures. In turn, 
VCs who had been working only for large firms tend to evaluate higher those teams that have prior 
experience in large firms. And second, VCs who themselves have an engineering and managerial 
education will tend to rate teams in which both competencies are present much higher than VCs who 
                                                 
1
  We will use the terms venture team, managing team and founding team as synonyms in this article. 
2
  Conjoint analysis has been used in recent studies in this field, e.g., by Shepherd and Zacharakis (1998) who 
argue that this approach improves the validity of research into the decision making practices of VCs. 
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do not have this background. VCs who have only management training give relatively high ratings to 
teams whose members’ training has focused on management. Our findings clearly show that similarity 
biases do play a significant role in venture capitalists’ assessments of start-up teams. Hence, we are 
able to explain some of the variation occurring in venture capitalists’ assessments on the basis of 
psychological theories. 
Our results have important implications for academics and practitioners alike. Research should try 
and correct for similarity biases when using VC evaluations as indicators for new venture success 
factors. VCs will want to avoid these biases in order to arrive at an undistorted evaluation of team 
quality. While a similarity bias might have a positive effect if the rater subsequently becomes the 
team’s coach and if this similarity simplifies collaboration (which is debatable), we find that, certainly 
in big VC firms and in early stages of the evaluation process, the initial rater is in most cases not the 
person who conducts the follow-up relationship. Hence, the bias does have negative effects for VCs. 
For start-ups, our results imply that it matters considerably who in the VC firm reads the business 
plan, and that it will be worth the effort to identify the most suitable (i.e., most similar) contact person.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, research on the VC 
decision process is presented along with findings on similarity biases in decision making in other 
areas. Section 4 discusses the hypotheses guiding this study and section 5 describes the research 
design. In section 6, the empirical findings of this research are presented in some detail. A discussion 
of the implications of our results in section 7 concludes this paper. 
3 Previous research 
3.1 The venture capital investment decision process  
Studies on the investment decision processes of VCs and in particular on the criteria VCs employ 
to make their investment decisions have a relatively long tradition in entrepreneurship research, with 
the first studies ranging back to the 1970s (for an overview see Zopounidis, 1994). These studies have 
produced a number of valuable insights into the VC decision process. The results are often interpreted 
as direct evidence on the long-term success factors of new firms, because professional investors who 
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earn their money by investing in new firms are considered to possess much experience in 
distinguishing winners from losers (Riquelme and Rickards, 1992).  
Thus, the underlying premise of this line of research has been that venture capitalists are able to 
evaluate the success potential of start-ups objectively. “Objectivity” here means that their estimation is 
unbiased, i.e., on average, the VC’s assessment predicts the actual success of the start-up correctly, 
leaving aside some random error. This paradigm of objective VC financing decisions forms the 
implicit or explicit basis for studies that operationalized expected success of start-ups by using start-up 
evaluations made by VCs (Khan, 1986). The rhetoric of the venture capital industry backs the 
assumption of objectivity as financing decisions usually are affirmed as emerging from a clearly 
defined multi-stage evaluation process, starting with the appraisal of a business plan and including a 
thorough due diligence of the proposed venture. Several arguments can be brought forward to support 
this notion. First, the evaluation process and the resulting selection decisions are crucial to the success 
of a VC firm (Zacharakis and Meyer, 1999) and usually also to the individual VC’s personal income. 
Thus, both the VC firm and the individual evaluator have a strong incentive to avoid any form of bias. 
Second, the evaluator should also be able to avoid such bias, as VCs typically are highly trained 
professional investors (Barry et al., 1990).  
However, research in other fields has pointed to the fact that managerial judgment and decision 
making is not perfectly rational, but boundedly rational (Cyert and March, 1963; Simon 1955). In 
particular, scholars from organization science have identified several factors which explain deviations 
from a purely rational decision making process (Busenitz and Barney, 1997). These factors include the 
high costs associated with the pursuit of a purely rational decision process (Simon, 1979) and the 
information-processing limits of human beings (Abelson and Levi, 1985). A particularly important 
class of factors that inhibit perfectly rational decision making consists of biases and heuristics of 
decision makers (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Kahneman et al., 1982; Hogarth and Makridakis, 
1981;, Schwenk, 1988). Biases prevent decision-makers from correctly processing information 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974), yet, they are not per se evident, as their occurrence, magnitude as well 
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as their consequences are dependent on the nature of the decision task (Zacharakis and Shepherd, 
2001).  
Research on the VC decision making process has only recently begun to study potential biases. 
Zacharakis and Shepherd (2001) analyzed new venture investment decisions and found that 96% of 51 
participating VCs exhibited a significant overconfidence bias which affected their decision accuracy 
negatively. Shepherd et al. (2003) studied in how far experience impacts a VC’s evaluation process in 
a sample of 66 Australian VCs. Their results show that increasing experience is beneficial to VC 
decision making, yet only to a certain point – approximately 14 years of experience –, where 
additional experience actually has a negative marginal effect on reliability and performance.  
To date, studies are restricted to simple, “one-dimensional” biases only. They identify VCs’ 
characteristics and argue that these generally impact their evaluation decisions. Although some 
important deficiencies of VC decision making processes could be detected this way, the underlying 
rationale is still rather mechanistic as VCs are assumed to react in a stable manner, e.g., by being 
overly confident. If this was true, biases could be identified and corrected in a relatively easy way, 
thereby improving the quality of financing decisions, and preserving implications for research on the 
success factors of new ventures.  
A contribution of this paper is to introduce interaction biases into the evolving literature on VC 
decision-making. It is no longer assumed that VCs’ characteristics impact all their evaluation decisions 
in the same manner. Instead we argue that the interaction of the venture capitalist and the object at 
issue matters: specific VCs will evaluate specific start-ups in a systematically different way. The 
similarity between the evaluator and the members of the start-up team will impact the VC’s evaluation 
decisions. 
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3.2 The similarity effect 
“Birds of a feather flock together” is the saying that illustrates the basic hypothesis of this paper. 
The insight per se is not new.3 It has, however, been confined to psychology and hardly been 
incorporated into behavioral economics or management studies. One of the first to systematically 
analyze this phenomenon was the social psychologist Byrne (1971). He proposed a “similar-to-me” 
hypothesis: according to his theory, individuals rate other people more positively the more similar they 
are to themselves (or the more similar the rater believes they are). To understand the effect, 
psychologists usually draw upon three different theoretical backgrounds: (1) learning theory, (2) self-
categorization theory, and (3) social identity theory. These will be addressed in turn. 
(1) Byrne (1971) presented a reinforcement model based on learning theories in which similarity is 
perceived as being rewarding and dissimilarity works as a negative reinforcement. Perceived similarity 
causes an affective reaction (i.e., interpersonal attraction) which in turn impacts the evaluative 
response (see Lefkowitz, 2000, for an overview of empirical research supporting this notion).  
(2) Self-categorization theory implies that a person’s self-concept is based on the social categories 
he places himself in (e.g., age, gender, education etc.) and that he strives for having a positive self-
identity (Jackson et al., 1991; Turner, 1987). This desire causes him to have a preference for those 
who are similar with respect to the social category on which he bases his identity. One should note that 
this theory suggests that no actual interactions are necessary to provoke such a bias. 
(3) A related explanation is offered by social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982). It argues that people 
wish to belong to a group as this leads to the positive feeling of social identity. The assignment to a 
specific group (which can also be a “virtual” group as, e.g., “we engineers”) allows for in-group/out-
group comparisons which are biased towards the own group (Bass and Dunteman, 1963; Dustin and 
Davis, 1970; Brewer, 1979). Duck (1977) endorsed this by proposing a “filtering model,” suggesting 
that relatively superficial levels of similarity (e.g., same occupation) influence attraction and 
                                                 
3
  Goldstein (1980) cites Aristotle and Spinoza already describing such a relationship. 
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subsequent judgmental evaluations particularly at early stages in the acquaintance process. 
Conversely, “deeper” levels of similarity (such as personality) can be associated with attraction only 
after considerable information about the person to be evaluated has become available (see Harrison et 
al., 1998, for an empirical test).  
The “similar-to-me” hypothesis could be confirmed for many situations outside business life (e.g., 
marriage decisions4). It has also been successfully applied to some management fields that have a long 
tradition of psychologically-rooted reasoning, such as human resources management and marketing. 
For example, Lichtenthal and Tellefsen (2001) provided an overview of studies that explain the 
different outcomes of buyer-seller relationships by their actual and perceived similarity. Homburg et 
al. (2002) studied the effect of similarity on marketing channel relationships and found that 
relationship effectiveness is positively affected by similarity. There is considerable evidence that 
similarity affects the outcome of employment (e.g., Pfeffer, 1983) and graduate selection interviews 
(Anderson and Shackleton, 1990). Supervisors’ ratings of the effectiveness of subordinates are also 
affected by similarity biases (e.g., Tsui and O'Reilly, 1989).5  
As discussed above, the paradigm of objective financing decisions of VCs has been challenged 
only recently. Thus, it may not be astonishing that to date no study of similarity effects has been 
carried out in the realm of VC financing decisions. 
                                                 
4
  See Angier (2003) for a summary of recent studies from evolutionary biology. 
5
  In some situations there might be limits to similarity-effects. For example, when people are identical or have 
the feeling that others are closer to their “ideal self” than they are themselves, this may not lead automatically 
to attraction (e.g, Herbst et al., 2003). Also, in some situations (e.g. when complementary characteristics are 
desirable) opposites (rather than similar individuals) attract each other (Dryer and Horowitz, 1997). We 
cannot exclude the possibility that such effects impact the VC – start-up team relationship, as we are clearly 
just starting to explore the importance of similarity in this context. 
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4 Hypotheses 
In our study, we want to test for similarity biases in the venture capital decision making process as 
described in section 3.1. Even though similarity effects have been found in other fields, it is not 
obvious that significant and sizeable effects can be detected for VCs and venture teams. After all, as 
was shown in section 3.1, there are indeed good reasons to assume that the VC decision process is 
rational to a very high degree. In that regard, the deck is stacked against finding evidence in favor of 
our hypothesis. However, if similarity biases are present, describing and accounting for them is 
important, since earlier empirical results may be incomplete or even unreliable. If venture capitalists 
have a tendency of financing entrepreneurs “in their own image”, existing advice to entrepreneurs and 
firmly held research results may be in need of revision or amendment.6  
“Similarity” can be defined along a number of dimensions. In our study, we focus on the evaluation 
of the start-up management team characteristics for three reasons. (1) Research has shown that criteria 
related to the management team are consistently considered predominant in the VC evaluation process 
(Zopounidis, 1994).7 Compared to the perceived quality of the start-up team aspects such as market 
attractiveness, cashout potential, or product characteristics are rated as of lower importance. (2) The 
notion of similarity or dissimilarity between start-up team and VC makes more sense with respect to 
personal characteristics than, e.g., with respect to the start-up’s business model or industry. (3) 
                                                 
6
  A VC’s preference for founders whose profiles resemble his or her own would be rational if (a) such 
similarity simplified future collaboration between the VC and the start-up in case of financing, and (b) there 
was  a good chance that the rater became the coach of the future portfolio firm. However, given the size of 
VC firms assumption (b) will in most cases not be fulfilled. We comment in detail on conjecture (a) as an 
alternative, but unlikely explanation of our results in section 6 of the paper. 
7
  In our research, we can confirm this finding. When asked to rate the relative importance (a constant number 
of 12 points should be distributed among the three choices according to their subjective importance), the 51 
venture capitalists placed a mean value of 3.2 on the product idea, 3.4 on the market, and 5.4 on the venture 
team. The differences between these means in two sided t-tests are highly significant (product to team (t= 
-8.41, p<0.0001, market to team (t=-7.32, p<0.0001)).  
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Similarity or dissimilarity with respect to team characteristics is relatively easy to detect for a VC. It 
should be noted that other aspects of the start-up can also be subject to similarity impressions. Any 
business plan reveals potentially similar preferences, appraisals of future development of markets, 
argumentation patterns, conclusions etc. But these are neither as likely to be observed by the VC nor 
to be measured easily in an empirical study.  
Thus we state as our basic hypothesis: 
The higher the similarity between a venture capitalist and the members of a start-up team, 
the more favorable the evaluation by the venture capitalist will be. 
Theories of self-categorization and social identity suggest that this general hypothesis applies to 
dimensions only that are salient and of subjective importance to the evaluator (e.g., Turner, 1987). 
Only then do individuals perceive others either as members of the same category as themselves or as 
members of a category different from their own (Van Der Vegt et al., 2003). The identification of such 
dimensions is difficult as an individual’s lens for sense-making and signification varies across 
situations, institutional contexts, and over time (Smircich, 1983).  
In the following, we transform our basic hypothesis into testable (ceteris paribus) hypotheses. Our 
choice of dimensions with respect to which we formulate similarity hypotheses is guided by three 
considerations. First, as will be laid out in section 5.2, we focus on a particular stage of the evaluation 
process, namely the assessment of the written business plan. Hence, we only take those venture team 
characteristics into account that appear in the team description as part of the business plan. Our 
measures of similarity need to relate to these variables then. Second, we only include dimensions for 
which there is reason to believe that they are salient and important to the venture capitalists. And third, 
since we use a conjoint technique for our data collection, we have to keep the thought-experiments 
manageable for the interviewees. We therefore have to focus on a limited number of team attributes. 
Taking into account the above-mentioned considerations, we conducted seven exploratory 
interviews with venture capitalists, analyzed several dozens of real business plans, and evaluated the 
existing literature. This led us to choose the following dimensions of similarity for our study: age, 
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educational background, field of training (management or technical), prior professional experience 
(large firm or start-up) and experience in leading teams in previously held positions. These dimensions 
give rise to the following five hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1:  VCs will prefer start-up teams that are similar to themselves with respect to age. 
Hypothesis 2:  VCs will prefer teams in which their own level of education is shared by a large 
number of team members. 
Hypothesis 3: VCs will prefer teams in which their own field of training (management or 
technical) is shared by a large number of team members. 
Hypothesis 4: VCs will prefer teams in which their own professional background (start-up vs. 
large firm) is shared by a large number of team members. 
Hypothesis 5: VCs will prefer teams in which their own experience in leading teams is shared 
by a large of number of venture team members. 
We also include in our analysis two team characteristics that do not lend themselves easily to the 
formulation of similarity hypotheses – the extent of experience in the industry in which the start-up is 
assumed to be founded, and the extent to which the team members are acquainted. We do include 
these variables because the team descriptions used in the conjoint analysis, even though they are 
necessarily simplified, need to be realistic. This implies that they must contain the most important 
team characteristics.8  
5 Research design 
5.1 The sample 
For the present study, a total of 51 interviews were conducted between December 2001 and April 
2002 in 26 different VC firms, with individuals actively involved in the evaluation of business plans. 
                                                 
8
  Interviewees in a conjoint analysis typically find it difficult to rate objects that are described in an unrealistic 
or incomplete manner. 
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The VC firms were located in Munich, Berlin and Vienna. The description in the Appendix shows that 
our sample contains VC firms of different sizes, degree of internationalization, and industry focus. The 
focus of the respective VC funds is on telecommunication, software, and e-/m-commerce rather than 
on biotechnology, since the VC firms were chosen to match our hypothetical business model (see 
below).  
5.2 Conjoint approach – the interviews 
In order to test our hypotheses, we had to collect two types of data: (1) information on VC 
characteristics and (2) information on VC evaluation of start-up teams, and to operationalize our 
similarity measures from the collected VC and team data. 
(1) Information on VC characteristics  
Interviewees were asked about their age, education, professional experience, and experience as a 
venture capitalist. Those questions in our questionnaire that pertain to the study of similarity biases are 
shown in Figure 1. In Table 1, we describe the operationalization of VC characteristics as we employ 
them later in the construction of similarity variables. 
 




Please insert table 1 about here 
 
 
In addition, information was collected about the venture capital firm covering its size, funds 
volume, specialization on industries or financing stages, and its evaluation process. An aggregate 
description of the data obtained is provided in the Appendix. 
(2) Conjoint design  
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In collecting information on VC evaluation of start-up teams, we focus on an important early step 
in a venture capitalist’s assessment of a new venture, namely, the appraisal of the business plan. 
During this stage of the evaluation process, a decision has to be made whether to reject the venture 
proposal, or to pursue it further and to invite the venture team for a presentation (Dixon, 1991; Bagley 
and Dauchy, 1999). With more than 80% of new venture proposals typically being rejected during this 
initial stage (Roberts, 1991), the business plan is a particularly crucial document for venture capitalists 
and new venture teams alike.  
One central piece of the business plan is the team description. This presentation of the venture team 
is the focus of our analysis. There are four reasons for this choice. First, as was argued above, the 
initial assessment of the business plan is decisive for the project’s further fate. Second, a venture 
capitalist’s criteria in evaluating a team depend on the stage of the evaluation process, for reasons of 
observability. For example, the willingness of team members to cooperate within the team cannot be 
observed from the written business plan, and qualities such as perseverance and stress resistance will 
only be observable in the long run. Hence, when studying venture capitalists’ choice criteria it is 
important to clearly identify the step in the decision process where these criteria are applied. Third, we 
focus on this particular step because the team characteristics that are relevant here are comparatively 
objective, unlike, e.g., personal fit between team members (which becomes relevant in later stages). 
Fourth, the evaluation of the start-up team as described in the business plan can very well be simulated 
using conjoint analysis (see below). While in most other instances conjoint cards describe some real-
world object that the interviewee is asked to imagine, in our case the team description on the conjoint 
card is of the same nature as the object itself, namely, the team description in the business plan. Hence, 
apart from the necessary simplification of the team description, the conjoint approach in our analysis is 
unusually realistic; the criticism that “paper ventures” lack external validity (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 
1999) does not apply.  
There are several other reasons why a conjoint approach is suitable for the question at hand, and 
why it is superior to commonly used post hoc methods which collect data on VCs’ self-reported 
decision policies (Shepherd, 1999; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1999; Zacharakis and Meyer, 1998). In 
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retrospective surveys, venture capitalists may intentionally bias the result, or they may lack sufficient 
insight into their own decision processes to report them properly. The first problem is alleviated by the 
conjoint approach, since the link between responses and final results is less obvious; the second 
problem is actually solved by this approach, since we do not require the VCs to report a model of their 
own behavior.  
The evaluation of a start-up team by a VC depends on the type of the venture. For example, a 
biotechnology venture team most likely requires scientists from molecular biology, while for an online 
service, founders with management and information technology knowledge are needed. Hence, we had 
to define the type of business that the team under consideration was about to start with some degree of 
specificity. On the other hand, too specific a description of the venture would have implied the risk 
that individual interviewees identified the hypothetical start-up with a particular past experience; this 
would have compromised the external validity of our analysis. After a number of exploratory 
interviews on that matter we chose a description of the hypothetical venture that indicated the type and 
maturity of the venture, while remaining sufficiently general (see Figure 2). To ensure comparability, 
the venture description was identical for all teams. 
 
Please insert figure 2 about here 
 
 
The variables used in the team descriptions and their realizations are listed in Table 2. Given the 
high level of professionalism of our interviewees, it seemed feasible to use a full profile rank order 
method. Employing a reduced set plus two hold-outs led to 20 conjoint cards. Intuitively, this roughly 
amounts to randomly combining the various realizations of each of the seven attributes. 
We communicated to the interviewees that the team consists of four members. We chose this team 
size for several reasons. First, this was found to be a very common team size. Then, varying the 
number of team members did not seem to be too important, since VCs would often support the search 
for individuals to fill vacant positions in a venture team. Finally, the even number of team members 
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means that if the team is described as “some management, some engineering education”, then this 
could easily be interpreted as an even split between the two subgroups. 
 
Please insert table 2 about here 
 
 
A pre-test, where five venture capitalists were interviewed, confirmed that attributes and parameter 
values on the conjoint cards were well chosen, and that the task to rank 20 hypothetical teams was 
manageable. The initial business plan description was found to be too specific; it was corrected 
accordingly prior to the main survey. Structured interviews were then conducted by one interviewer 
who was present during the whole interview. During the interviews, none of the participants 
encountered any problems in ranking the 20 cards with the description of team characteristics, which 
were presented to all participants in the same order. In order to keep the interviews short and 
manageable, we asked for ordinal, not metric information on the interviewees’ team evaluations. 
(3) Operationalization of similarity variables  
In order to test our hypotheses, we had to operationalize similarity with respect to a number of 
dimensions, based on the data we had collected from our interviewees and the team descriptions. The 
similarity measures which we use in the empirical tests of these hypotheses are defined as follows.  
We measure similarity in age (Hypothesis 1) via two dummy variables. The first one is coded as 
one if the VC rater is older than 40 and the team members are between 35 and 45 years old (zero in all 
other cases). The second dummy variable is coded as one if the VC rater is younger than 30 and all 
team members are in the age bracket between 25 and 35 years, and again zero in all other cases. 
Similarity in the level of university education (Hypothesis 2) is somewhat more difficult to define, 
since all of the interviewed venture capitalists have a university degree. In order to test for potential 
effects of similarity in education, we use the following operationalization. We defined one dummy 
variable which was coded as one if the first degree of the VC had been an apprenticeship training and 
if the simulated team did not contain any individual with university training (zero in all other cases). 
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We then defined another dummy variable for those cases in which all team members were supposed to 
have university training and the VC herself had obtained a doctorate degree (again coded one in this 
case, and zero in all other cases).9 Since none of the four VCs who had initially gone through 
apprenticeship training had acquired a doctorate, the two variables do not overlap. 
Similarity in the field of education (Hypothesis 3) is measured using three dummy variables. The 
first one is coded as one if the VC and all team members have technical training only, and as zero in 
all other cases; correspondingly, the second one assumes the value of one if the VC and all team 
members have management training only, and zero in all other cases. The case of complementary 
competencies (VC has both technical and management training and the team includes some team 
members with management and some with technical backgrounds) is a separate dummy variable. 
Similarity in prior job experience (type of firm) (Hypothesis 4) is again operationalized by 
identifying three groups of observations where similarity is most pronounced. The first variable 
identifies cases where the VC rater had been working in start-ups only before joining the VC industry, 
and where the members of the team had start-up experience only. The second variable characterizes 
analogous cases where the experience of the VC and the team members comes from working in large 
firms. Finally, we generated one variable for those cases in which both the VC and the team members 
had obtained experience in start-ups and large firms. 
We measure similarity in team leadership experience (Hypothesis 5) accordingly by identifying one 
group of observations for which both the VC and all team members have only weak experience in 
personnel responsibility; and another group for which both the VC and all team members have 
extensive experience of this type. 
                                                 
9
  Doctoral degrees are more common in continental Europe than in Anglo-Saxon countries. In our sample of 
51 VCs, 11 of them had obtained a doctorate degree. In the presence of similarity biases, this group would 
show more affinity towards teams consisting of members who all have academic training. 
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6 Empirical results 
Our objective is to describe the impact of our team variables and of the similarity measures on the 
assessment that a team in our conjoint experiment receives. The assessments are measured as rankings, 
i.e., in ordinal form. Before we undertake a multivariate analysis of our data, we briefly consider some 
descriptive statistics. For each of the respondents, we determine the cases that were ranked in the top 
quartile (i.e., which had been given one of the upper five ranks). In Table 3, we tabulate the percentage 
of the overall number of cases with the respective realization of feature x that were ranked in the upper 
quartile. For example, there are six teams whose members are between 35 and 45 years old. Of these 
six teams, on average 2.24 (37.3%) were ranked in the top quartile. Within team characteristics, we 
order the realizations by their share of top quartile ranks. The second column contains the preferred 
realization, the third column the second-best, and the forth column the least preferred realization. This 
tabulation is a first indication of which realizations lend themselves to successful outcomes. In a sense, 
the realizations listed in the second column of Table 3 describe the “dream team” which combines all 
of the preferred characteristics. We will use these realizations in the multivariate analysis to define the 
reference groups for our dummy variables describing team characteristics. 
 
Please insert table 3 about here 
 
 
We describe now our multivariate analysis in which we try to test for similarity effects, once the 
impact of team characteristics has been taken into account. Our estimation approach relies on a latent 
variable approach. We assume that venture capitalist k assigns team i a metric indicating the VC’s 
willingness to finance the team. We model the metric that a team receives as a continous function Rki 
of our seven basic team variables (j=1,...,7) – which enter the equation with two realizations Dj1 and D 














The error terms are assumed to be i.i.d. within each VC (across team cases), but not necessarily 
independent across VCs (within team cases). The ratings that the 20 simulated teams receive may very 
well be affected by unobservable interpretations of a particular team constellation which are shared 
across the rating VCs. In this case, one would expect that corr(εki, εli) ≠ 0. We do not observe the 
metric Rki itself, but instead the ranking information from our conjoint experiment. From the rankings, 
we compute the ranking quartile in which team i was put by the venture capitalist. We then apply an 
ordered probit model10 to the quartile information. The potential correlation across VCs (within teams) 
is taken into accout by representing our data as a cluster sample and employing a Huber-White 
variance-covariance estimator in order to obtain conservative statistical inference results.11 We can use 
our maximum-likelihood estimators to test the hypotheses derived in section 4 and to retain a preferred 
specification which includes the similarity measures that are statistically relevant. Finally, we compute 
the effect sizes of our variables, since the coefficients in the ordered probit cannot be interpreted 
easily.  
Since our right-hand side variables are discrete binary regressors, we need to identify reference 
groups within each dimension. We take the preferred variable realizations displayed in Table 3 as our 
                                                 
10
  See Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, ch. 15) for a detailed description of binary and ordered probability 
models. We experimented with alternative specifications, e.g., (i) simple probits using top quartile status as 
the dependent variable and (ii) ordered probits using the top five ranks and the three subsequent quartiles as 
the ordinal dependent variable. Qualitatively, the results are similar and the inference results are the same as 
the ones reported here. Using specficication (ii), i.e., taking the exact ranking in the top quartile into account 
leads to an improvement of information used, but since we need to estimate a larger number of threshold 
parameters at the same time, the overall effect on the precision of our estimates is neutral. These estimates 
are available upon request. The choice of ordered probit over other types of ordered probability models is 
arbitrary. Using ordered logit estimators yields qualitatively similar results, which is not surprising, since the 
logit and the normal distribution are very similar. Moreover, in a small sample as the one here we cannot test 
empirically which distribution is the better choice. 
11
  For the estimation, we employ the ordered probit estimator in STATA 8.0. 
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reference cases. The coefficients for our dummy variables will then indicate the extent to which the 
team’s success is reduced by deviating from the “dream team” characteristics. Therefore, we should 
expect negative coefficients for all of the respective dummy variables. As to our similarity measures: 
the base case is a combination of venture capitalist and team to be rated without any similarity as 
measured by our twelve dummy variables discussed at the end of section 5. 
The estimation results are displayed in Table 4. A positive coefficient in these results always 
implies a positive effect, i.e., an improvement of a team’s ranking. To discuss the effect size of our 
variables, we list in column (4) the marginal effect of the respective variable on the probability of 
being in the top quartile of the rankings. The marginal effects are based on the specification in column 
(3).12 
We first discuss the results for our team characteristics variables. While these results are not the 
primary focus of the paper, they are illustrative of the advantages of the conjoint approach followed in 
this paper. Consider the estimates in column (1) of Table 4. We achieve a reasonable pseudo-R-
squared value13 of 0.227 with this estimate, and we easily reject the hypothesis that all coefficients are 
jointly equal to zero. As we expected, all coefficients carry negative signs, indicating that the reference 
categories of our dummy variables do indeed characterize the “dream team” configuration. All but one 
of the coefficients are significant at the 5 or 1 percent levels. The multivariate results confirm the 
descriptive evidence summarized in Table 3: VCs prefer to see teams with older (i.e., more 
experienced) founders all of whom have an academic education, experience in the relevant industry 
                                                 
12
  Closer inspection of the data shows that there is no major multicollinearity problem. The correlation 
coefficients between the team characteristics appearing in our team descriptions are extremely low and never 
exceed 0.15 which is due to our conjoint design. The correlation between similarity variables and team 
characteristics can be higher; but the maximum that we observe is a Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficient of 0.432 for the correlation between the variable “VC and team with experience mostly in large 
firms” and “team members’ prior job experience mostly in large firms”. 
13
  This measure cannot easily be compared with the R-squared from an OLS regression. If we simply used OLS 
to regress the rank position on the independent variables used in column (2), the R-squared would be 0.542. 
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and experience in leading teams, a mixed background in the field of training and experience in both 
start-ups and large firms. 
 
Please insert table 4 about here 
 
 
Our hypotheses state that particular VC raters will prefer particular teams if there is similarity 
between the rater and the team. We would therefore expect to see positive significant coefficients for 
our similarity variables if such effects were present. Such a result would clearly indicate that the 
assessments of different VC raters will be influenced by their own experience and background. In 
column (2) we introduce all of our twelve similarity measures into the regression in order to test this 
hypothesis. There is a significant gain in explanatory power – performing a Wald test on the 
hypothesis that all similarity coefficients are jointly equal to zero is clearly rejected (χ2(12)=55.98, 
p<0.0001). But the results also show that only two of the five subgroups of similarity variables carry 
coefficients that are individually significant at the 10 percent level or better. Similarity in age 
(Hypothesis 1), in level of education (Hypothesis 2) and in experience in leading teams (Hypothesis 5) 
do not appear to matter statistically. We perform Wald tests for each of the groups and for all three 
groups jointly.14 We cannot reject the hypothesis (either by group or jointly) that these similarity 
variables do not matter statistically. Conversely, we also test whether the remaining two blocks of 
similarity variables (field of education, Hypothesis 3, and type of professional background, Hypothesis 
4) have any statistical relevance. Again using Wald tests derived from the results in column (2), we 
compute test statistics for Hypothesis 3 (χ2(3)=14.41, p<0.001) and Hypothesis 4 (χ2(3)=21.27, 
                                                 
14
  The test statistics are: for similarity in age (Hypothesis 1) - χ2(2)=0.89, p=0.641; for similarity in type of 
education (Hypothesis 2) - χ2(2)=0.10, p=0.952; for similarity in leadership experience (Hypothesis 5) - 
χ2(2)=1.13, p=0.568. The joint test yields a chi-squared test statistic of 8.44 with 6 degrees of freedom 
(p=0.208). 
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p<0.001) which demonstrate the statistical relevance of these two types of similarity measures. The 
joint test yields a chi-squared test statistic of 46.72 with 6 degrees of freedom (p<0.001). 
As indicated in the hypotheses section, it is difficult to assess a priori which dimensions are salient 
and important to VCs. Hence, it is not surprising that not all hypotheses are supported. It is interesting 
to note, however, that the dimensions of similarity that are statistically relevant differ from those that 
are not. Both the field of education and the professional background are (a) freely chosen by the 
respective person and (b) in most cases constant over time. In contrast, age and personnel responsiblity 
are not a matter of choice, and they vary over time. It seems in alignment with theory of social identity 
that stable and choice-based variables are more important for constituting similarity bonds between 
individuals than characteristics that are contingent on the environment (Garza and Herringer, 1987). 
This finding may provide an important hint for further tests of the similarity hypothesis.15  
Note also that all coefficients that are individually significant carry a positive sign. This is 
consistent with our expectations – after all, we stated in our hypotheses that increased similarity would 
lead to an improvement in the ranking of the respective team.16 The fact that we do not find any 
negative, statistically significant coefficients supports our theoretical interpretation of similarity biases 
quite nicely. Suppose that because of her own experience, a venture capitalist can assess a team 
sharing some characteristics with the VC more precisely than other VCs who do not have this 
particular experience. Then we would expect that some of the assessments made by the well-informed 
VC would be more positive, and some more negative than those of other VC raters. It is the very fact 
that our significant similarity effects are all associated with positive coefficients that makes it 
extremely difficult to argue that such effects emerge from a rational and completely logical assessment 
                                                 
15
 Following this logic, we would also expect the level of education to show a significant effect. However, as 
we pointed out before, our sample provides little variation in this variable, which at least partly explains the 
lack of significance.  
16
  Although we have a directional hypothesis, the level of significance indicated in Table 4 for the individual 
variables is based on two-sided tests. 
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of team quality. In our view, they constitute strong evidence supporting the notion of important 
similarity biases in the assessment process.17 
Since the inclusion of a large number of statistically irrelevant variables is going to affect the 
overall precision of our estimates, we restrict the specification in column (4) to the basic team 
characteristics and those similarity variables that were jointly significant in column (3). Indeed, 
estimating this specification gives us a modest gain in precision, but the estimated coefficients differ 
only marginally from those displayed in column (3). Now, five out of six of the remaining similarity 
variables carry significant, positive coefficients (with p<0.1).18 
In column (4) of Table 4, we finally compute the effect sizes associated with our variables. In order 
to have an intuitively appealing interpretation, we compute the average change in the probability of 
being among the top five teams associated with switching from the respective reference group to the 
group indicated by our respective independent variable. All other variables are held constant so that 
the computed marginal effects differ across observations. We report the average of the observation-
specific marginal effects. To give an example, our reference case for team age is a team with members 
between 35 and 45 years old. Holding every other variable at their empirical values, a shift to a team 
with members who are between 25 and 45 years old reduces the probability of being in the top quartile 
of teams on average by 11.3 percentage points. A shift to a more heterogeneous team whose members 
                                                 
17
  As one referee suggested, it is possible to differentiate our reference groups w.r.t. the dissimilarity between 
VC and team. When we introduce – for each of the five groups of similarity variables – a set of dissimilarity 
variables (in total 10 additional variables), we find them to be insignificant jointly as well as individually. We 
need to interpret this result cautiously, since we have only ordinal measures of similarity. The statistical 
insignificance of all dissimilarity regressors may be due to our operationalization. Nonetheless, we find it 
worthwhile to study the potentially differential impact of similarity and dissimilarity in future work. 
18
  The test statstistics for this specification are: for similarity in field of training (Hypothesis 3) - χ2(3)=9.64, 
p=0.020; for similarity in type of professional background (Hypothesis 4) - χ2(3)=15.94, p=0.001. The joint 
test yields a chi-squared test statistic of 28.51 with 6 degrees of freedom (p=0.001). 
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are between 25 and 45 years old causes a slightly smaller average reduction of 8.6 percentage points. 
Thus, the marginal effects in column (4) describe, for an otherwise average team, the “penalty” for 
deviating from the optimal realization of the respective characteristic.  
For our purposes, the team variables themselves are not the primary focus. We would like to see if 
the statistically significant results regarding our similarity effects also translate into notable effect 
sizes. For some of the similarity variables, this is indeed the case: in cases where the VC and the team 
have received training in technical fields and management, the likelihood of being in the top quartile 
of teams increases by 7.5 percentage points. Similarly, in cases where the VC and the team members 
have had professional experience in startups only, the teams are awarded a 7.3 percent bonus, after 
taking all other variables into account. These effect sizes are hardly trivial. Note that teams whose 
members have management training only receive a penalty of 24.5 percentage points (relative to the 
optimal configuation). But in cases where the VC shares this disadvantage, the team receives a bonus 
of 5.0 percentage points. Similarly, a configuration of VC and team members both having solely a 
large-firm background results in a 3.7 percentage point gain for the team. We can conclude that the 
effects associated with the similarity biases are somewhat smaller than those for the basic team 
variables, but they do have a significant and strong effect on the overall selection of teams by venture 
capitalists. 
To summarize, we find a consistent tendency for some similarity measures to have a positive effect 
on team assessments. We do not find any evidence that similarity measures have a negative impact on 
team ratings. As we pointed out, this asymmetry in our results is very important for our interpretation. 
While our evidence appears to be stable in statistical terms, the estimated rank movements also show 
that similarity effects are smaller than the impact of the major team characteristics, but by no means 
unimportant. The existence of these similarity effects brings about a number of implications which we 
discuss in the final section. 
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7 Discussion and conclusion 
The purpose of this research study is to test if VC evaluations of start-up teams suffer from a 
similarity bias. The results of our study confirm the existence of this distortion due to the interaction of 
characteristics of VC and start-up team. The more closely the team members’ profiles resemble that of 
the VC with respect to two important dimensions, the better – on average – the team will be rated. We 
find a rather strong similarity bias for the type of education: VCs who had received training both in 
engineering and in business gave a significantly higher rating than other VCs to teams whose members 
have an education partly in engineering, partly in business. Similarly, VCs who had received training 
in business administration only rated teams whose members also have an education only in business 
higher than other VCs. A strong bias also exists with respect to the type of firm where VC and 
members of the venture team have gathered prior professional experience. A rater who had been 
working exclusively in start-ups before joining the VC industry has a highly significant preference for 
teams whose members have prior experience mostly from start-ups. The same effect can be observed 
for VCs with prior experience obtained in large firms only; these individuals tend to prefer teams 
whose members have largely come from a large-firm background. 
As any empirical study, our analysis and results come with some caveats. Due to our research 
design, we are limited to five dimensions of similarity. We find significant effects for stable and 
choice-based characteristics. It may well be that also other stable (e.g. sex, social and regional origins) 
or choice-based (e.g. university or other affiliations) characteristics have a likewise similarity effect. 
Future research on this issue is necessary. 
One important alternative explanation of our results deserves a detailed comment. VCs might rate 
teams whose background is different from their own and thus unfamiliar to them on average correctly. 
However, they might be less proficient in assessing the team members’ credentials in the respective 
field, and thus attain a lower accuracy in their rating. Given risk aversion, the rater might perform a 
risk-correction and downgrade the respective team. This effect would be even more pronounced if 
erroneous positive evaluations are considered more severe than erroneous negative evaluations by the 
VC. However, the latter assumption seems implausible given the early evaluation phase that we 
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consider. A false positive merely means that one team too many is invited for presentation. In fact, a 
false negative — excluding a team which in fact has a high potential — might actually constitute the 
bigger downside for the rater. Apart from that, in our experiment there were no credentials to assess. 
Finally – and most importantly – we find that VCs with both management and technical education still 
rate pure management teams as well as pure technical teams lower than heterogeneous teams. They do 
so despite the fact that they (the VCs) are familiar with these teams’ respective background, such that 
a downward risk correction is not appropriate. Thus, the suggested alternative explanation of our 
findings does not appear convincing – they can indeed best be explained as similarity effects. 
Our results have important implications for future research and for practitioners, for prospective 
entrepreneurs as well as their advisors and investors. As to academic research, most earlier studies of 
the VC evaluation process (with some notable exceptions discussed before) made the implicit 
assumption that VCs’ ratings (of business plans, teams, etc.) are centered around a “correct” 
evaluation, deviating from it by random errors. Our results reject this assumption – deviations are not 
random, but contain systematic errors. These biases can be explained by including characteristics of 
the rater into the analysis. Future research into the VC evaluation process should take these results into 
account. Similarly, they are relevant for research into success factors of start-ups, as far as this 
includes assessments by VCs.  
A rather interesting avenue for further research is to investigate similarity biases in later stages of 
the evaluation process. The present study finds significant biases even though the information 
describing the team was presented in a relatively objective manner, namely, in written form. Hence, 
we would expect even stronger distortions in later stages of the evaluation process, where personal 
interaction between rater and ratees plays a more prominent role. However, studying such effects will 
be challenging. Experimental designs become difficult to realize when face-to-face interaction is 
involved. On the other hand, real-world interactions – interviews, presentations – between VCs and 
venture teams are hard to observe, and even then they pose the problem of disentangling effects of 
team and business plan characteristics.  
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Venture capital firms should be somewhat worried about the similarity biases we identify. After all, 
what the “ideal team” for a new venture is should depend on the venture itself and maybe on some 
characteristics of the VC firm. The rater’s personal profile, however, should only matter if this same 
person is likely to be the venture’s coach in case the VC firm does grant financing. Under such 
circumstances it is possible – though by no means sure – that similarity simplifies interaction between 
the parties. A similarity bias would hence have some positive effects. In general, however, the initial 
rater will not be the team’s future coach, such that the bias’ negative effects come to bear. The 
influence of similarity biases on financing decisions is aggravated by the fact that, in our survey, in 55 
percent of all cases plans are read by only one person before a decision to reject the proposal or to 
proceed with the evaluation is taken.  
Hence, what can VC firms do to deal with the problem of biased evaluations? First of all, raters 
should try to get better insights into their individual decision processes (Zacharakis and Meyer, 1998; 
Shepherd, 1999), and should in particular find out if and to what degree they are prone to similarity 
biases. This may be done by systematic comparison and discussion of real team evaluations by 
different raters. Alternatively, VCs may employ an analysis as performed in this study, which could 
thus serve as a sort of decision aid for VCs similar to those suggested by Shepherd and Zacharakis 
(1999). Second, business plans (except those that are either good or bad beyond doubt) should be 
evaluated by more than one person, where it is clearly important that the readers’ profiles are different. 
This leads to the third suggestion, namely, that VC firms should recruit their analysts in such a way as 
to achieve a healthy heterogeneity among their staff, in particular with respect to the type of education 
they have received and prior professional experience. 
For new venture teams, our results imply that it may be important to find the right person within a 
VC firm who gets to read the business plan first. Thus, there are at least two practical implications for 
a start-up team seeking venture capital. First, while the common recommendation in the 
entrepreneurship literature states that start-up teams should attempt to submit their business plan via a 
person who is known to the VC, the majority of plans still is handed in on a “cold-call” basis. Thus, 
for those start-up teams that lack personal access to the VC of their choice, it seems to be a promising 
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strategy to conduct some prior research on the professionals in the VC firm who are involved in 
scanning business plans. Then they can try to submit their plan directly to the person whose profile fits 
best according to the criteria discussed in this paper. Though there are several evaluation criteria being 
used by VCs during the screening process, this strategy which focuses on the predominant evaluation 
criteria should to some extent improve the chances of getting past the first round of evaluations, where 
typically more than 80% of all new venture proposals are rejected (Roberts, 1991). Second, start-up 
teams should not be easily discouraged by a rejection, as it may be due to the fact that the team’s and 
the rater’s profiles were significantly different, and may not say too much about the team’s and the 
venture’s true qualities. 
Predicting new firm performance is a very challenging undertaking. Given the sums that are at 
stake in the VC industry, the quality of an investor’s evaluation process is crucial. Since, as 
MacMillan et al. (1985) point out, one should bet on the jockey, not the horse in order to identify 
emerging firms with high prospects for success, our analysis focuses on team characteristics – the 
most important dimension of a new venture. By pointing out flaws in the standard process, this study 
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Figure 1 





























• What kind of education did you receive? (several answers possible) 
     Apprenticeship        University degree        Ph.D.        Master 
• What is your field of education? (several answers possible) 
     Business/economics        Technical        Science        Law        Other: ____________  
• What is your age? ___  years 
• For how many years have you been working as a VC investor?   ___  years 
• For how long have you been working with your current employer?  ___  years 
• Do you have professional experience from fields outside VC? If so, … 
 a)   ... in companies of what size? (several answers possible) 
   Start-up        SME        large firms        no professional experience in other firms 
 b) … did you have, as a manager, responsibility for staff? 
   no        1-5 staff        6-20 staff        > 20 staff 
• How important do you consider product idea, market, and venture team in your investment decisions? 
Please attribute a total of 12 points to these features, according to their importance. 
  product idea ___ points 
  market  ___ points 
  venture team ___ points 
 
project is based on a patented technical product 
considerable cost savings for users 
value proposition is clearly visible 
potential users are small and medium-sized industrial firms 
a working prototype exists 
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Table 1 
Attributes and realizations  of VC characteristics  
pertaining to similarity effects  
 
age of VC 
30 yrs and younger 
N=8 
between 30 and 40 years 
old 
N=34 
40 yrs and older 
N=9 
level of education 





any degree , but no 
























large firm only 
N=15 
start-up and large 
firm 
N=16 
other type of firm 
N=18 
prior VC experience 
in leading teams 
none 
N=9 












Attributes and realizations   
of team characteristics as used on conjoint cards 
 
Variable Realization 1 Realization 2 Realization 3 





level of education: 
unversity degree 
 
none of the team 
members 
(N=6) 
some team members 
(N=7) 
all team members 
(N=7) 






prior job experience: 
type of firm 
mostly large firms 
(N=9) 














experience in leading 
teams 












for a longer time, 
privately 
(N=7) 







Percentage of top quartile observations  





















all team members 
29.4% 
 
some team members 
10.5% 
none of the team 
members  










prior job experience: type of 
firm 
30.2% 







mostly large firms 









no one  
experience in leading teams 









no one  
acquaintance among team 
members 
32.7% 
for a longer time, 
professionally 
23.0% 





 Table 4 
Ordered Probit Estimation Results on Rank Quartiles 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coefficient (S.E.) Coefficient (S.E.) Coefficient (S.E.) Marginal Effects 
All team members between 25 and 35 years old -0.497*** -0.460*** -0.500*** -0.113 
 (0.088) (0.097) (0.089)  
All team members between 25 and 45 years old -0.372*** -0.346*** -0.373*** -0.086 
 (0.095) (0.089) (0.096)  
No team member with academic education -0.977*** -0.988*** -0.982*** -0.205 
 (0.086) (0.075) (0.086)  
Some team members with academic education -0.176** -0.174*** -0.173** -0.044 
 (0.074) (0.061) (0.075)  
All team members with business administration training only -1.064*** -1.116*** -1.107*** -0.245 
 (0.091) (0.099) (0.099)  
All team members with technical training only -0.810*** -0.714*** -0.723*** -0.169 
 (0.075) (0.066) (0.067)  
Team members' prior job experience mostly in large firms -0.134* -0.162 -0,166 -0.035 
 (0.089) (0.119) (0.112)  
Team members' prior job experience mostly in start-ups -0.158** -0.145* -0.149** -0.032 
 (0.073) (0.074) (0.073)  
No team member with prior experience in the relevant industry -1.810** -1.825*** -1.824*** -0.375 
 (0.090) (0.090) (0.091)  
Some team members with prior experience in the relevant industry -0.351*** -0.353*** -0.353*** -0.108 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.077)  
No team member with prior experience in leading teams -0.802*** -0.763*** -0.809*** -0.171 
 (0.049) (0.067) (0.049)  
Some team members with prior experience in leading teams -0.164** -0.140* -0.168** -0.041 
 (0.070) (0.077) (0.070)  
Team members acquainted privately for some time -0.359*** -0.362*** -0.362*** -0.078 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.069)  
Team members acquainted only briefly -0.616*** -0.622*** -0.621*** -0.126 
 (0.063) (0.064) (0.063)   
 40 
 
VC 40 yrs and older  - team members between 35 and 45 years old  0.164   
  (0.190)   
VC 30 yrs and younger - team members  between 25 and 35 years old  -0.061   
  (0.229)   
VC with apprenticeship training - no team member with academic education 0.075   
  (0.172)   
VC with doctorate degree - all team members with academic education  -0.007   
  (0.177)   
VC and team with technical training only  -0.105 -0.069 -0.014 
  (0.121) (0.117)  
VC and team with management training only  0.254** 0.235** 0.050 
  (0.104) (0.106)  
Team and VC with management and technical training  0.350** 0.343** 0.075 
  (0.175) (0.169)  
VC and team with experience mostly in start-ups  0.319* 0.331** 0.073 
  (0.186) (0.168)  
VC and team with experience mostly  in large firms  0.174 0.174* 0.037 
  (0.117) (0.104)  
VC and team with experience in start-ups and large firms  0.083** 0.071** 0.015 
  (0.034) (0.026)  
VC and team with strong experience in leading teams  0.059   
  (0.076)   
VC and team with weak experience in leading teams  -0.104   
  (0.191)   
Cutoff value 1 -3.871 (0.188) -3.740 (0.176) -3.796 (0.193)  
Cutoff value 2 -2.887 (0.169) -2.750 (0.158) -2.806 (0.174)  
Cutoff value 3 -1.854 (0.143) -1.707 (0.129) -1.765 (0.147)  
Test 1: all team characteristics - p-value (df) p<0.001 (14) p<0.001 (14) p<0.001 (14)  
Test 2: all similarity variables  - p-value (df) - p<0.001 (12) -  
Test 3: similarity in age, type of education, leading teams - p-value (df) - p=0.183 (6) -  
Test 4: similarity in firm type experience, discipline of training - p-value (df) - p<0.001 (6) p<0.001 (6)  
Observations 1020 1020 1020  
log L -1093.59 -1087.25 -1088.20  
Pseudo R2 0.2266 0.2313 0.2304  
Chi-squared 2170.7 1325.4 826.7  
degrees of freedom 14 26 20  
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 *
 For categorial variables, the number of respondents who chose the respective category is given.    ** Multiple answers possible. 41 
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Appendix: Demographics of surveyed VC firms and individuals 
VC firms (N = 26) 
Age (years): mean = 8.2, standard dev. = 12.6, median = 3, range: 1-56 
Size (number of professionals):   mean = 75.4, standard dev. = 202.8, median = 9, range: 1-800 
Funds volume (EURO):*    <10 mio.: 2; 26-100 mio.: 8; 101-250 mio.: 5; >250 mio.: 9; n.a.: 2 
Investment stage:* ** seed: 10; start-up: 17; first-stage: 20; expansion: 17; later stages: 8 
Industry focus:* ** telecommunication: 23; software: 22; e-/m-commerce: 19;  
 electrical engineering: 13; biotechnology: 10; services: 5; other: 13 
Location of interviews (offices):* Munich: 40; Vienna: 7; Berlin: 4 
 
Individuals (N = 51) 
Age:   mean = 35.0, standard dev. = 6.7, median = 34, range: 24-57 
Education level:* **  apprenticeship: 4; university degree: 51; MBA: 15; Doctorate: 11 
Education type:* **   business/economics: 39; engineering: 18; science: 6; law: 3; other: 2 
VC experience (years):   mean = 3.9, standard dev. = 5.2, median = 2, range: 0-30 
Tenure with firm (years):  mean = 2.4, standard dev. = 2.0, median = 2, range: 0-11 
Number of business plans evaluated:  mean = 460, standard dev. = 455, median = 300, range: 0-2000 
Prior professional experience:  
Type of firm:* **  start-up: 22; SME: 23; large firm: 35; no prior experience: 0 
Industry:* **   management consulting: 28; manufacturing: 25; financial services: 13; other: 9 
Personnel responsibility*   none: 9; 1-5 subordinates: 20; 6-20 subordinates: 16; >20 subordinates: 6 
